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ABSTRACT
The notice and takedown/putback procedures in § 512 of the
Digital Millennium Act fail to adequately protect the rights of
individuals who post content on the internet. This iBrief examines
the notice and takedown/putback procedures and Judge Fogel's
decision in Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., which requires a
copyright owner to conduct a fair use evaluation prior to issuing a
takedown notice. This iBrief concludes such a requirement is an
appropriate first step towards creating adequate protection for
user-generated content on the Internet.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
On August 20, 2008, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California denied a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim in the action of Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. 2 Although the
opinion is of limited precedential value—it was not scheduled for
publication— the case has received substantial attention for its treatment of
the fair use defense in the context of takedown notices under the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”). Deciding the question of first
impression, the court concluded that a copyright owner must determine
whether a particular use is protected under fair use, in order to proceed
under § 512(c), which requires “a good faith belief that use of the material
in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its
agent, or the law.” 3 The court held that a failure to consider fair use prior to
issuing the takedown notice was sufficient to constitute a cause of action for
misrepresentation under § 512(f). 4 This paper argues that the fair use
analysis imposed by the Lenz court provides for appropriate consideration
under the notice and takedown/putback procedures under § 512 of the
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DMCA, ensuring that the critical balance between a copyright owner’s
monopoly and the rights of the public is protected on the Internet.

I. FACTS
¶2
On February 8, 2007, Stephanie Lenz uploaded a video onto
YouTube, a popular site hosting “user generated content.” 5 The video
showed her children dancing in the kitchen. 6 Playing in the background
was the song “Let’s Go Crazy” by Prince. 7 Lenz allegedly posted the video
in order to share it with her family and friends. 8
¶3
Universal, who owns the copyright to “Let’s Go Crazy,” sent a
takedown notice to YouTube, as provided under Title II of the DMCA,
codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000). 9 YouTube removed the video and sent
Lenz an email informing her of the counter-notification procedures. 10 Lenz
then sent YouTube a counter-notification, pursuant to U.S.C. § 512(g),
arguing that her use constituted fair use. 11 YouTube re-posted the video. 12

On July 24, 2007, Lenz filed suit against Universal for
misrepresentation under U.S.C. § 512(f) and for tortious interference with
her contract with YouTube. 13 She also filed for a declaratory judgment of
non-infringement. 14 She argued that Universal sent the take-down notice
because Prince requested that they do so, and not because they actually
believed the use of the song in the video to be an infringing use of their
copyright. 15 Prince has been outspoken in his belief that it is wrong for his
music to be used in any user generated content site without his
permission. 16
¶4

In response, Universal filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted
on April 8, 2008. 17 Lenz filed an amended complaint on April 18, 2008,
only retaining her claim of misrepresentation. Universal again filed a
motion to dismiss. 18
¶5

5
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In order to grant Universal’s motion to dismiss, the court would
have had to find that Lenz’s claim of misrepresentation was not grounded
on an entitlement for relief, requiring that she show more than “labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action.” 19 Both parties agreed Lenz used copyrighted material and that
Universal owns the copyright to the material. 20 The question presented to
the court was whether the good faith requirement of § 512(c)(3)(A)(v)
required Universal to consider whether Lenz’s use constituted fair use. 21
¶6

II. DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
¶7
The DMCA was signed into law on October 28, 1998. Congress
sought to update copyright law “to make digital networks safe places to
disseminate and exploit copyrighted materials.” 22 The act is divided into
five titles, detailing different aspects of digital copyright law. 23 Title I,
implementing the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright
Treaty, provides protection for copyright owners and “creates the legal
platform for launching the global digital on-line marketplace for
copyrighted works.” 24 Title II articulates the liability of Internet service
providers (ISPs) for copyright infringements transmitted over their
networks. 25 Title I and Title II work in tandem to “make available via the
Internet the movies, music, software, and literary works that are the fruit of
American creative genius,” while limiting the liability faced by ISPs in
order to ensure that “the efficiency of the Internet will continue to improve
and that the variety and quality of services on the Internet will expand.” 26

III. ANALYSIS OF FAIR USE UNDER § 512

A. The Importance of Fair Use to Copyright Law
¶8
Fair use has long been considered a critical component of the
monopoly protection provided by copyright. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., the Supreme Court stated that, “from the infancy of copyright
protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has been
thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘to promote the

19

Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal
citations omitted)).
20
Id. at 1153–54.
21
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25
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Progress of Science and useful Arts.’” 27 The fair use doctrine recognizes
that most expression is not strictly original, but rather borrows from the
wealth of literature and art that came before it. 28 Therefore, the monopoly
granted by copyright is restricted to allow for “a limited privilege in those
other than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a
reasonable manner without the owner’s consent.” 29 Through this limited
right to use copyrighted material, fair use “encourages and allows the
development of new ideas that build on earlier ones, thus providing a
necessary counterbalance to the copyright law’s goal of protecting creators’
work product.” 30 In this way, fair use preserves and fosters the same
creativity that copyright law was created to encourage. 31
B. Congressional Intent in Enacting the DMCA
¶9
The DMCA was enacted to help negotiate liability for copyright
infringement over the Internet in a way that protected the rights of copyright
holders while preserving the ability of ISPs to function and grow without
crippling liability. The Senate Report states that Title II of the DMCA was
enacted to “[preserve] strong incentives for service providers and copyright
owners to cooperate to detect and deal with copyright infringements [while]
. . . provid[ing] greater certainty to service providers concerning legal
exposure for infringements that may occur in the course of their
activities.” 32 Title II establishes a balance between the public’s interest in
protecting ISPs from liability and providing protection for copyright
owners. Central to this balance is the notice and takedown/putback process,
which allows copyright holders to stop infringing uses of their copyrighted
materials on the Internet while creating immunity for ISPs if they follow the
prescribed steps for removing the infringing material.
¶10
Section 512(c) deals with limitation of liability for “information
residing on systems or networks at the direction of users.” 33 Congress stated
that they were “acutely concerned” about providing “appropriate procedural
protections to ensure that material is not disabled without proper
justification.” 34

Congress attempted to protect the rights of end-users through a
balance of § 512(f) and § 512(g). Section 512(f) provides a cause of action
¶11

27

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (quoting U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8).
28
Id. at 575
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Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1986).
30
Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 719 (9th Cir. 2007).
31
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577.
32
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 20 (1998).
33
17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2008).
34
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 15 (1998).
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to users where the copyright owner knowingly makes material
misrepresentations during the notice and takedown/putback process. 35 This
limited liability allows end-users to sue bad faith actors who knowingly
misrepresent the infringing nature of a particular use. 36 Copyright owners
also have a potential cause of action against users who make knowing and
material misrepresentations as part of a putback request under § 512(g). 37
Congress stated that § 512(f) was designed to create liability for “knowingly
false allegations to service providers in recognition that such
misrepresentations are detrimental to rights holders, service providers, and
Internet users.” 38
Congress also attempted to protect the rights of end users through
the putback process articulated in § 512(g). Congress stated that § 512(g)
was enacted “to address the concerns of several members of the Committee
that the other provisions of this title established strong incentives for service
providers to take down material, but insufficient protections for third parties
whose material would be taken down.”39 Section 512(g) empowers users to
request replacement of material believed, in good faith, to have been
“removed or disabled as a result of mistake or misidentification of the
material . . . .” 40
¶12

C. Problems with the Protection Provided to End-Users Under the DMCA
1. The Skewed Protection of the Notice and Takedown/Putback
Requirements
¶13
Congress stated that the combination of § 512(g)’s putback
procedures with § 512 (f)’s liability for knowing misrepresentation provides
the proper balance for “the need for rapid response to potential infringement
with the end-users[’] legitimate interests in not having material removed
without recourse.” 41 However, the protection under § 512(f) and § 512(g)
35

17 U.S.C § 512(f) (2008) ("[A]ny person who knowingly materially
misrepresents under this section – that material or activity is infringing, or that
material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification,
shall be liable . . .”).
36
See Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., 391 F.3d, 1000, 1005 (9th
Cir. 2004) (stating that Congress’s intent was that the statute “protect potential
violators from subjectively improper actions by copyright owners” (emphasis
omitted)).
37
17 U.S.C. § 512(f)(2) (2008).
38
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 35.
39
Id.
40
17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3) (2008).
41
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 15 (1998).
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grants the benefit of doubt to the copyright holder in a way that significantly
impairs fair use on the Internet.
¶14
The way the notice and takedown/putback procedures are currently
set-up drastically disadvantages end-users. 42 When an ISP receives a
takedown notice, they are “incentivized to immediately take down the
content without any investigation because such take down provides a safe
harbor from ISP liability to the copyright holder.” 43 As long as they
comply with a counter-takedown notice, the ISP has further disincentive to
investigate the takedown notice because § 512(g) immunizes the ISP from
liability to the end-user. 44
¶15
When the copyright holder sends the takedown notice, the ISP must
take down the material, “expeditiously,” and does not need to contact the
user first. 45 In contrast, when a user files a counter-notification, the ISP
cannot repost the material for 10 days, and must first alert the copyright
holder. 46 The ISP can only repost and maintain their insulation from
liability under § 512 if the copyright holder does not respond to the counternotice. 47 If the copyright holder decides to file suit, however, the ISP is
required to not repost. 48
¶16
All presumptions in the notice and takedown/putback procedure
favor the copyright holder. 49 The statutory scheme grants even greater
protection to a copyright owner than the owner would have at trial. In
court, a copyright owner would have to prove that the material is infringing
their copyright. 50 Conversely, under the DMCA the user’s material is
“assumed illegal on the bare say-so of the copyright holder.” 51

42

See Malla Pollack, Rebalancing Section 512 to Protect Fair Users from Herds
of Mice-Trampling Elephants, or A Little Due Process Is Not Such a Dangerous
Thing, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 547, 560–61 (2006)
(arguing notice and takedown/putback procedures of § 512 should be replaced
by a statutory digital fair use right, supported by a notice and takedown
procedure that protects the rights of fair users).
43
Id. at 560.
44
See id. at 560–61.
45
Id. at 561 (quoting U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(c) (2008)).
46
Pollack, supra note 42, at 561.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id. (“[The user’s] material is assumed illegal on the bare say-so of the
copyright holder. That core requirement of due process, an independent decision
maker is curiously absent. The copyright holder can block reposting merely by
filing suit; no judicial decision is needed.”).
50
See id.
51
Id.
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In a 2006 survey of the notice and takedown/putback process, the
results show that the concerns for the rights of end-users are not merely
academic. 52 The survey demonstrates that there is an exceptionally low
incidence of counter-notices in proportion to the number of takedown
notices. 53
¶17

2. The Failure of § 512(f) to Provide Adequate Protection Against
Misuse of § 512(c) Against End-Users
¶18
An additional failure of the user protection under § 512 is the
difficulty of obtaining a remedy against those who are misusing the notice
and takedown process. The previously mentioned 2006 survey of the
process noted that the “data [shows] the process [is] commonly being used
for other purposes: to create leverage in a competitive marketplace, to
protect rights not given by copyright (or perhaps any other law), and to
stifle criticism, commentary and fair use.” 54 Despite the prevalence of
potential misuse of the takedown process, it is difficult for a user to obtain
relief under § 512(f).
¶19
In Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of America Inc., the Ninth Circuit
determined that the good faith requirement in § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) is to be
evaluated according to a subjective standard. 55 The Ninth Circuit noted
that federal statutes encompassing “good faith” beliefs are traditionally
interpreted to require a subjective good faith belief in order to satisfy the
requirement. 56 Although no federal circuit had yet decided whether §
512(c)’s good faith requirement required subjective belief, other cases had
previously established that “the objective reasonableness standard is distinct
from the subjective good faith standard and that Congress understands this
distinction.” 57 The fact that Congress did not include an objectively
reasonable standard means it intended to have the good faith requirement

52

See generally Jenifer Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or ‘Chilling
Effects’? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Act,
22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621 (2006).
53
See id. at 679–80 (discussing how survey evidence revealed very little
evidence of counter-notices, however, the results might be skewed by the fact
that most take-down notices surveyed were search index notices)
54
Id. at 687.
55
Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., 391 F.3d, 1000, 1004 (9th Cir.
2004) (“[I]nterpretive case law and the statutory structure of § 512(c) support
the conclusion that the ‘good faith belief’ requirement in § 512 (c)(3)(A)(v)
encompasses a subjective, rather than objective, standard.”).
56
Id.
57
Id.
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determined according to a subjective standard. 58 The Ninth Circuit noted
that the statutory structure also supports inferring a subjective standard for
the good faith requirement. Section 512(f) of the DMCA imposes liability
on copyright owners only if their misrepresentations under § 512 amount to
knowing misrepresentations. 59 Thus, there is only liability under § 512(f) if
there is a “demonstration of some actual knowledge of misrepresentation on
the part of the copyright owner.” 60 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the
“actual knowledge” requirement of § 512(f) combined with the “good faith”
belief of § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) illuminates Congress’ intent that § 512 only
protect “potential violators from the subjectively improper actions by
copyright owners.” 61 The subjective bad faith standard imposed by Rossi
makes it exceedingly difficult for an end-user to succeed in a claim for
misrepresentation against a copyright holder.
¶20
The combination of the unbalanced protection provided by the
notice and takedown/putback requirements with the high judicial bar to
remedies against copyright holders who misuse the procedure illuminates
the failure of the DMCA to adequately protect end-users. 62

IV. HOLDING
¶21
Lenz brought suit against Universal under 17 U.S.C. § 512(f),
which creates liability for copyright owners who “knowingly materially
misrepresent” that the material or activity that they requested to be removed
was actually infringing. 63 Because both parties agreed that Lenz used
copyrighted material and that Universal owned the rights to the copyright,64
Universal’s statement that the video was infringing would only have been a
misrepresentation if it believed that the use was not fair. In order to
determine whether Universal is liable under § 512(f), the court first needed
58

Id. The court notes that “where Congress uses terms that have accumulated
meaning under the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise
dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these
terms.” Id. at 1004 n.4 (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999)).
59
17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2008) (“[A]ny person who knowingly materially
misrepresents under this section that material or activity is infringing or that
material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification
shall be liable . . .”)
60
Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1105.
61
Id.
62
See Urban & Quilter, supra note 52, at 688 (“[T]he ex ante takedown in the
[§] 512(c) context, combined with the lack of counternotice use and other
procedural defects, is the feature of the system [of copyright protection
established under § 512] that strikes the greatest blow to due process and
fairness.”).
63
17 U.S.C. § 512(f)(1) (2008).
64
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1153–54 (N.D. Cal.
2008).
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to decide whether 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) “requires a copyright owner
to consider the fair use doctrine in formulating a good faith belief that use of
material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright
owner, its agent, or the law.” 65
¶22
The court stated that a use is authorized by law if it is “one
permitted by law or not contrary to law.” 66 Even if fair use constitutes an
excused infringement, “the fact remains that fair use is a lawful use of a
copyright.” Because fair use is a lawful use, a copyright owner must
consider whether the contested use qualifies as a fair use before it is able to
issue a good faith statement of belief that the use is not authorized by law. 67
Furthermore, failure to consider fair use before stating that the use is
infringing is sufficient to allege a misrepresentation under § 512(f) of the
DMCA. 68

Universal argued that a fair use consideration upsets the balance of
the DMCA takedown procedure because investigating fair use would delay
or unduly burden the copyright owner’s ability to rapidly issue a take-down
notice. 69 While acknowledging Universal’s concerns, the court decided
Universal overstated the impact of a fair use determination. 70 Universal
argued that it will be difficult for a copyright owner to predict whether a
court would agree with their determination of fair use, and thus they would
be less willing to issue takedown notices. 71 The Lenz court responded by
pointing out that the copyright owner’s determination of fair use merely has
to meet the subjective standard of good faith established for the
misrepresentation action under § 512(f). 72 The court also dismissed
Universal’s argument that the fact-intensive nature of a fair use inquiry
would unreasonably burden a copyright owner’s ability to rapidly respond
to infringements. 73 The court noted that the Copyright Act establishes the
four factors that copyright holders should consider when judging fair use.
Considering the four factor analysis, the court concluded that, while some
uses might require more complicated evaluations, in general, “a
consideration of fair use prior to issuing a takedown notice will not be so
¶23

65

Id. at 1154 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (internal quotations
omitted)).
66
Id. at 1154.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 1154–55.
69
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
70
Id.
71
See id.
72
Id. (“The ‘good faith belief’ requirement in § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) encompasses a
subjective, rather than objective, standard.” (quoting Rossi v. Motion Picture
Ass’n of Am., Inc., 391 F.3d, 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 2004))).
73
Id. at 1155.
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complicated as to jeopardize a copyright owner’s ability to respond rapidly
to potential infringements.” 74 Furthermore, the fair use investigation only
has to be part of the initial review, which, under Rossi, does not require a
“full investigation to verify the accuracy of a claim of infringement,” further
weakening Universal’s argument that the fair use investigation would
deprive them of their ability to rapidly issue takedown notices. 75
¶24
The court also stated that the existence of § 512(f) requires an
investigation of fair use under the good faith belief in § 512(c)(3)(A)(v).
The Lenz court asserted that to exclude a fair use consideration from the
good faith requirement would effectively render § 512(f) “superfluous”
because it would make copyright owners “immune from liability by virtue
of ownership alone.” 76
¶25
Having decided that a copyright owner must consider fair use under
§ 512 (c)(3)(A)(v) before issuing a takedown notice, the court then held that
Lenz’s claims were sufficient, at least for the pleading stage, and denied
Universal’s motion to dismiss. 77 However, the court noted that it had
“considerable doubt that Lenz will be able to prove that Universal acted
with the subjective bad faith required by Rossi,” and suggested that
summary judgment might be appropriate after discovery, even if Lenz was
able to state a sufficient cause of action at the pleading stage. 78
¶26
The court held that requiring a consideration of fair use before
issuing a takedown notice was consistent with the purpose of the statute
because it strikes the proper balance between “ensur[ing] that the efficiency
of the Internet will continue to improve and that the variety and quality of
services on the Internet will expand without compromising the movies,
music, software and literary works that are the fruit of American creative
genius.” 79

CONCLUSION
¶27
In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court stated that the Internet is a
“major platform of speech.” 80 The importance of the Internet as a forum for
speech has increased in the time since the Court’s opinion. In light of the

74

Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
Id. at 1155–56 (emphasis omitted).
76
See id. at 1156.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
(citing S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
80
Id. at 682 (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)).
75
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skewed protection afforded by the DMCA, 81 the Lenz court’s decision that
copyright holders are required to consider fair use before issuing a
takedown notice is supported by the equitable concerns posed by the
DMCA.
The fair use consideration imposed by Lenz is limited. As
Universal argued, it is difficult to predict whether a particular use will be
considered fair. However, Lenz is not imposing liability on copyright
owners who were unable to accurately predict whether a court would decide
that a particular use was fair. The standard for liability under § 512(f) is
still subjective bad faith. Therefore, the fair use requirement only creates
liability in situations where “an alleged infringer uses copyrighted material
in a manner that unequivocally qualifies as fair use, and in addition there is
evidence that the copyright owner deliberately has invoked the DMCA not
to protect its copyright but to prevent such use.” 82 Even those situations
would still pose a high bar before a user could recover. The facts in Lenz
are exactly the type of situation where the fair use requirement would come
into play. The court describes how
¶28

Lenz alleges that Universal is a sophisticated corporation familiar with
copyright actions, and that rather than acting in good faith, Universal
acted solely to satisfy Prince. Lenz alleges that Prince has been
outspoken on matters of copyright infringement on the Internet and has
threatened multiple suits against internet service providers to protect
his music. Lenz also alleges that Universal acted to promote Prince’s
personal agenda and that its actions “ha[ve] noting to do with any
particular [YouTube] video that uses his songs.” 83

Despite that this is exactly the type of situation where the court imagines
fair use protecting the interests of Internet users, the court stated that it “has
considerable doubt that Lenz will be able to prove that Universal acted with
the subjective bad faith required by Rossi.” 84 The fair use requirement
would not open the copyright holders to unmanageable liability. The user
still has a significant hurdle to prove that the copyright holder acted in
subjective bad faith when it determined that the use was not protected under
fair use.

81

See Urban & Quilter, supra note 52, at 682 (“Removal of speech from the
Internet, with very little or no process, is a strong remedy for allegations of
infringement, especially where there are so few resources available to the
targeted speaker.”).
82
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1155 n.5 (N.D. Cal.
2008).
83
Id. at 1156 (citations omitted).
84
Id.
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The Supreme Court has stated that “the sole interest of the United
States and the primary object in conferring the [copyright] monopoly lie in
the general benefits derived by the public from the labor of authors.” 85 Fair
use is a critical element to preserving the benefit to the public that justifies
the monopoly granted to a copyright holder. The fair use requirement
established by Lenz attempts to extend this balance to the notice and
takedown/putback procedures of the DMCA, ensuring that copyright is
limited to its intended scope within the domain of the Internet, where the
concerns of creativity and free speech are exceptionally prevalent.
¶29

85

Sony v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984) (quoting Fox Film
Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).

